The Disparate Equilibria of Algorithmic Decision Making when Individuals
  Invest Rationally by Liu, Lydia T. et al.
The Disparate Equilibria of Algorithmic Decision Making when
Individuals Invest Rationally
Lydia T. Liu∗
University of California, Berkeley
Ashia Wilson
Microsoft Research
Nika Haghtalab
Cornell University
Adam Tauman Kalai
Microsoft Research
Christian Borgs
Microsoft Research
Jennifer Chayes
Microsoft Research
Abstract
The long-term impact of algorithmic decision making is shaped by the dynamics between the
deployed decision rule and individuals’ response. Focusing on settings where each individual de-
sires a positive classification—including many important applications such as hiring and school
admissions, we study a dynamic learning setting where individuals invest in a positive outcome
based on their group’s expected gain and the decision rule is updated to maximize institutional
benefit. By characterizing the equilibria of these dynamics, we show that natural challenges to
desirable long-term outcomes arise due to heterogeneity across groups and the lack of realiz-
ability. We consider two interventions, decoupling the decision rule by group and subsidizing
the cost of investment. We show that decoupling achieves optimal outcomes in the realizable
case but has discrepant effects that may depend on the initial conditions otherwise. In contrast,
subsidizing the cost of investment is shown to create better equilibria for the disadvantaged
group even in the absence of realizability.
1 Introduction
Automated decision-making systems that rely on machine learning are increasingly used for high-
stakes applications, yet their long-term consequences have been controversial and poorly under-
stood. On one hand, deployed decision making models are updated periodically to assure high
performance on the target distribution. On the other hand, deployed models can reshape the un-
derlying populations thus biasing how the model is updated in the future. This complex interplay
between algorithmic decisions, individual-level responses, and exogeneous societal forces can lead to
pernicious long term effects that reinforce or even exacerbate existing social injustices [Crawford,
2017, Whittaker et al., 2018]. Harmful feedback loops have been observed in automated deci-
sion making in several contexts including recommendation systems [Pariser, 2011, Conover et al.,
2011, Chaney et al., 2018], predictive policing [Ensign et al., 2018], admission decisions [Lowry and
Macpherson, 1988, Barocas and Selbst, 2016], and credit markets [Fuster et al., 2017, Aneja and
Avenancio-Leon, 2019]. These examples underscore the need to better understand the dynamics of
algorithmic decision making, in order to align decisions made about people with desirable long-term
societal outcomes.
Automated decision-making algorithms rely on observable features to predict some variable of
interest. In a setting such as hiring, decision making models assess features such as scores on
standardized tests, resume, and recommendation letters, to identify individuals that are ideally
∗Correspondence to: lydiatliu@cs.berkeley.edu
1
ar
X
iv
:1
91
0.
04
12
3v
1 
 [c
s.G
T]
  4
 O
ct 
20
19
qualified for the job. However, equally qualified people from different demographic groups tend to
have different features, due to implicit societal biases (e.g., letter writers describe competent men
and women differently), gaps in resources (e.g., affluent students can afford different extra-curricular
activities) and even distinct tendencies in self-description (e.g., gender can be inferred from biogra-
phies [De-Arteaga et al., 2019]). Therefore, a model’s ability to identify qualified individuals can
widely vary across different groups.
The deployed model’s ability to identify qualified members of a group affects an individual’s
incentive to invest in their qualification. This is because one’s decision to acquire qualification—not
observed directly by the algorithm—comes at a cost. Moreover, individuals that are identified by
the model as qualified (whether or not they are truly qualified) receive a reward. Consequently,
people invest in acquiring qualifications only when their expected reward from the assessment model
beats the investment cost.
Rational individuals are aware that upon investing they would develop features that are similar
to those of qualified individuals in their group, so they gauge their own expected reward from
investing by the observed rewards of their group.1 If qualified people from one group are not duly
identified and rewarded, fewer people from that group are incentivized to invest in qualifications in
the future. This reduces the overall fraction of qualified people in that group, or the qualification
rate. As the assessment model is updated to maximize overall institutional profit on the new
population distribution, it may perform even more poorly on qualified individuals from a group
with relatively low qualification rate, further reducing the group’s incentive to invest.
To understand and mitigate the challenges to long-term welfare and fairness posed by such
dynamics, we propose a formal model of sequential learning and decision-making where at each
round a new batch of individuals rationally decide whether to invest in acquiring qualification and
the institution updates its assessment rule (a classifier) for assessing and thus rewarding individuals.
We study the long-term behavior of these dynamics by characterizing their equilibria and comparing
these equilibria based on several metrics of social desirability. Our model can be seen as an extension
of Coate and Loury [1993]’s widely cited work to explicitly address heterogeneity in observed
features across groups. While Coate and Loury [1993]’s model focuses on a single-dimensional
feature space, i.e., scores, and assessment rules that act as thresholds on the score, our model
considers general, possibly high-dimensional, feature spaces and arbitrary assessment rules, which
are typical in high-stakes domains such as hiring, admissions, etc.
We find that two major obstacles to obtaining desirable long-term outcomes are heterogeneity
across groups and lack of realizability within a group. Realizability, which is the existence of a
(near) perfect way to assess qualifications of individuals from visible features, leads to equilibria
that are (near) optimal on several metrics, such as the resulting qualification rates, their uniformity
across groups, and the institution’s utility. We study (near) realizability and the lack thereof in
Sections 3 and 5 respectively. Heterogeneity across groups, i.e., lack of a single assessment rule
that perfectly assesses individuals from all groups, necessitates tradeoffs in the quality of equilibria
across different groups. We study heterogeneity, as well as interventions for mitigating its negative
effects, in Section 4. In Section 6, we empirically study a more challenging setting where the groups
are heterogeneous as well as highly non-realizable. For this we perform simulations with a FICO
credit score dataset [US Federal Reserve, 2007] that has been widely used for illustration in the
algorithmic fairness literature.
Interventions To mitigate the aforementioned tradeoffs, we consider two common interventions:
decoupling the decision policy by group and subsidizing the cost of investment, especially when the
1Strong group identification effects can also be seen in empirical studies [Hoxby and Avery, 2013].
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Figure 1: Causal graph for the individual investment model. The individual intervenes on the node
for qualification, Y—this corresponds to do(Y = y))—which then affects the distribution of their
features X, depending on the group A.
cost distribution inherently differs by group. Our model of dynamics sheds a different light on these
interventions, complementary to previous work. We show that decoupling [Dwork et al., 2018]—
using group-specific assessment rules—achieves optimal outcomes when the problem is realizable
within each group, but can significantly hurt certain groups when the problem is non-realizable and
there exist multiple equilibria after decoupling. In particular, decoupling can hurt a group with
low initial qualification rate if the utility-maximizing assessment rule for a single group is more
disincentivizing to individuals than a joint assessment rule, thereby reinforcing the status quo and
preventing the group from reaching an equilibrium with higher qualification rate.
We also study subsidizing individuals’ investment cost (e.g. subsidizing tuition for a top high
school), especially when the cost distribution is varied across different groups. We find that these
subsidies increase the qualification rate of the disadvantaged group at equilibrium, regardless of
realizability. We note that our subsidies, which affect the qualification of individuals directly, are
different than those studied under strategic manipulation [Hu et al., 2019] that involve subsidizing
individual’s cost to manipulate their features without changing the underlying qualification (e.g.
subsidizing SAT exam preparation without changing the student’s qualification for college) and
could have adverse effects on disadvantaged groups. Instead, our theoretical findings resonates
with extensive empirical work in economics on the effectiveness of subsidizing opportunities for a
disadvantaged group to directly improve their outcomes, such as moving to better neighborhoods
to access better educational and environmental resources [Chetty et al., 2016].
Related work Our work is related to a rich body of work on algorithmic fairness in dynamic
settings [Liu et al., 2018, Hu and Chen, 2018, Hashimoto et al., 2018, Zhang et al., 2019, Mouzannar
et al., 2019], strategic classification [Hu et al., 2019, Milli et al., 2019, Kleinberg and Raghavan,
2019], as well as statistical discrimination in economics [Arrow, 1973, Coate and Loury, 1993,
Arrow, 1998] We present a detailed discussion of the similarities and differences in Section 7.
2 A Dynamic Model of Algorithmic Decision Making
In this section we introduce a model of automated decision making with feedback. We start by
introducing the notation used throughout the paper and then describe the details of the interactions
between individuals and an institution, and the resulting dynamical system.
2.1 Notation
We consider an instance space X , where X ∈ X denotes the features of an individual that are
observable by the institution. We also consider a label space Y = {0, 1} where Y = 1 indicates that
an individual has the qualifications desired by the institution and Y = 0 otherwise. We denote the
set of all protected/group attributes by A where A ∈ A denotes an individual’s protected attribute.
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We denote the group proportions by na := P(A = a) for all a ∈ A. Furthermore, we denote the
qualification rate in group a ∈ A by pia := P(Y = 1 | A = a). An individual from group A = a who
has acquired label Y = y (to become qualified or not)2 receives features X distributed according
to P(X = x | Y = y,A = a). This is illustrated in Figure 1.
We also consider a set of parameters Θ that are used for assessing qualifications. We use Yˆθ ∈ Y
parameterized by θ ∈ Θ to denote the assessed qualification of an individual. We assume that Yˆθ
only depends on the features X, which may or may not contain A or its proxies. In later sections, we
will also discuss interventions that allow us to use Yˆθ that explicitly depends on group membership
A. We respectively define the true positive rate and false positive rate of θ ∈ Θ on group a ∈ A by
TPRa(θ) = P(Yˆθ = 1 | Y = 1, A = a), and
FPRa(θ) = P(Yˆθ = 1 | Y = 0, A = a).
2.2 Model Description
Individual’s Rational Response We consider a setting where an individual decides whether
to acquire qualifications, that is, to invest in obtaining label Y = 1, prior to observing their
feature X. The decision to acquire qualification depends on the qualification assessment rule θ ∈ Θ
currently implemented by the institution. We will characterize the groups’ qualification rates as
the best-response to θ by function pibr(θ) = (pibra (θ))a∈A.
To get label Y = 1 an individual has to pay a cost C > 0. In any group, C is distributed
randomly according to the cumulative distribution function (CDF), G(·).3 After deciding whether
to acquire qualifications, an individual gets features X and is assessed by θ. An individual (from
any group and regardless of actual qualification) receives a payoff of w > 0 if they are assessed to
be qualified and payoff of 0 otherwise. Therefore, the expected utility an individual from group
a receives from acquiring qualification Y = 1 is wP[Yˆθ = 1|Y = 1, A = a] − C = wTPRa(θ) − C
whereas the expected utility for not acquiring the qualification is wP[Yˆθ = 1|Y = 0, A = a] =
wFPRa(θ). Given the qualification assessment parameter θ ∈ Θ, an individual from group a
acquires qualification if and only if the benefit outweighs the costs, that is
w(TPRa(θ)− FPRa(θ)) > C. (1)
Then each group’s qualification rate as a function of a qualification assessment parameter θ is
pibra (θ) := P(Y = 1 | A = a) = P(C < w(TPRa(θ)− FPRa(θ)))
= G(w(TPRa(θ)− FPRa(θ))).
Institution’s Rational Response We consider an institution that has to choose a qualifica-
tion assessment parameter for accepting individuals to maximize its utility. We assume that the
institution gains pTP > 0 for accepting a qualified individual and loses cFP > 0 for accepting an
2This can be seen as the individual performing a do-intervention on Y [see e.g., Pearl, 2009]. Thus we may write
do(Y = 1) for making the decision to acquire qualifications. Our model (Figure 1) assumes that Y is not the child
of any node, so we in fact have P(· | do(Y = y)) = P(· | Y = y). Therefore we drop the do-operator whenever we
condition on Y .
3For the rest of this work, unless otherwise stated, we assume that the distribution of costs, G, is the same for
every group. In Section 4.3 and 6, we will consider the implications of having different cost distributions by group.
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unqualified individual. Then the expected utility of the institution for applying parameter θ is
pTPP(Yˆθ = 1, Y = 1)− cFPP(Yˆθ = 1, Y = 0)
= pTP
∑
a∈A
TPRa(θ)piana −
∑
a∈A
cFPFPRa(θ)(1− pia)na.
This illustrates that the utility maximizing parameter is a function of pi = (pia)a∈A, i.e., the rate of
qualification in each group. We denote this function by θbr(pi), defined as follows:
θbr(pi) := argmax
θ∈Θ
pTP
∑
a∈A
TPRa(θ)piana −
∑
a∈A
cFPFPRa(θ)(1− pia)na. (2)
To ensure the above object (and the resulting dynamics) are well-defined, when multiple param-
eters θ achieve the optimal utility we assume that θbr(pi) is uniquely defined using a fixed and
well-defined tie-breaking function.
We note that throughout this paper we assume that the institution has exact knowledge of many
quantities such as TPRa(θ), FPRa(θ), and na. In a nutshell, we assume that we have infinitely
many samples from the underlying distributions. We discuss this further in Section 8, and leave
the finite sample version of these results to future work.
Although we choose not to focus on game-theoretical aspects in this work, we note that our
model can be thought of as a large game [Kalai, 2004] or a game with a continuum of players
[Schmeidler, 1973].
Dynamical System and Equilibria We are primarily interested in the evolution of qualification
rate, pi, over time. Given a current rate of qualification pi the assessment parameter used by the
institution in the next step is θbr(pi), which in turn leads to a qualification rate of pibr(θbr(pi)) in
the next step. Therefore, we define a dynamical system for a given initial state pi(0) such that at
time t we are in state pi(t) = Φ(pi(t− 1)), where Φ = pibr ◦ θbr.
We say that the aforementioned dynamical system is at equilibrium if pi = Φ(pi). Equivalently,
we are at an equilibrium if pi = limn→∞Φn(pi(0)) is well-defined for some pi(0), where Φn is an
n-fold composition of Φ. We call such values of pi equilibria, or equivalently, fixed points of Φ.
In general, Φ may have multiple fixed points that demonstrate different characteristics. We
therefore compare the fixed points of Φ on several metrics of societal importance.
1. Stability: We say that an equilibrium pi∗ is stable if there is a non-zero measure set of initial
states pi(0) ∈ [0, 1] for which pi∗ = limn→∞Φn(pi(0)). In particular, if there exists a neigh-
borhood around pi∗ such that all points converge to pi∗ under the dynamics, we say that
pi∗ is locally stable. As such, stable fixed points are robust to small perturbations in the
qualification rate, which can occur due to random measurement errors.
2. Qualification Rate of Group a: Recall that pia is the fraction of individuals in group a who
have decided to invest in qualifications. Since it is more desirable to have a high qualification
rate in each group, we may compare equilibria based on pia. We refer to pia = G(w) as the
optimal qualification rate in group a, which is the maximum achievable qualification rate
corresponding to the perfect assessment rule.4
4If group a has a group-specific cost distribution, Ga, then we refer to Ga(w) as the optimal qualification rate in
group a.
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3. Balance: We may be interested in equilibria where the qualification rate is similar across
groups, that is, to prioritize equilibria with smaller maxa1,a2∈A |pi∗a1−pi∗a2 |. When this quantity
is 0 we say that pi∗ is fully balanced.
4. Institutional utility: We may compare equilibria based on their corresponding institution
utility.
2.3 Examples From the Real World
Let us instantiate our model in the setting of two important applications from the real world.
College Admissions Consider the college admission setting, whereX corresponds to the features
that the college can observe, e.g., a candidate’s test scores and letters of recommendation. Y
indicates whether the candidate meets the qualifications required to succeed in the program. C
is the cost of investing in the qualifications, e.g., the money and opportunity cost of studying or
taking additional courses to obtain the required qualifications. A candidate from group a will
develop features from distribution P[X = x|Y = y,A = a], where y = 1 indicates a qualified
candidate. The differences in the feature distribution between groups can be attributed to several
factors such as resources that are available to different groups, e.g., letters of recommendations for
qualified female and male candidates often emphasize different traits. θ is the decision parameter
used by the college, e.g., Yˆθ = 1 when the candidate has SAT score of > 1400 and an excellent
recommendation letter. The college accepts applicants by trading off between the utility gain, pTP,
of admitting qualified candidates and utility cost, cFP, of admitting an unqualified candidates. The
candidate is incentivized to acquire the qualifications for the college based on the long term benefit
(described in Equation (1)) that depends on their expected gain w from completing a college degree
and how likely it is to be admitted to college for a qualified or unqualified member of the group
the candidate belongs to.
Hiring Consider the hiring setting, where X corresponds to the features that the firm can observe,
e.g., a candidate’s CV. Y indicates whether the applicant meets the qualifications required by the
firm, e.g., having the required knowledge and the ability to work in a team. C is the cost of
acquiring the qualifications required by the firm, e.g., the (monetary and opportunity) cost of
acquiring a college degree or working on a team project. Parameter θ is the hiring parameter used
by the firm, e.g., Yˆθ = 1 when the applicant has a software engineering degree and two years of
experience. The firm accepts candidates according to utility assessment involving pTP, the profit
from hiring a qualified candidate, and cFP, the cost of hiring an unqualified candidate e.g., the
loss in productivity or the the cost to replace the employee. The candidate, on the other hand, is
incentivized to acquire the qualifications for the job based on factors including their expected salary
w and how likely it is to be hired by the firm given how the firm has hired qualified or unqualified
candidates from the group the candidate belongs to (Equation (1)).
We also consider a stylized example of lending in Section 6.
3 Importance of (Near) Realizability
We start our theoretical investigation of dynamic algorithmic decision making with the classical
model of realizability. In the theory of machine learning, a distribution is called realizable if there
is a decision rule in the set Θ whose error on the distribution is 0. Analogously, we call a setting
realizable when there is a decision rule θopt ∈ Θ that perfectly classifies every individual from every
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group, that is TPRa(θ
opt) = 1 and FPRa(θ
opt) = 0 for all a ∈ A. Realizability is a widely used
assumption and is the basis of seminal works such as Boosting [Freund and Schapire, 1997]. At
a high level, realizability corresponds to the assumption that there is an unknown ground truth
assessment rule, for example, in a hypothetical setting where x includes all the information that
is sufficient for assessing one’s qualification, and the chosen set of decision rules is rich enough to
contain it.
In static realizable applications of machine learning, the goal is to (approximately) recover
θopt from data. We show that in the our dynamic setting, under realizability, the unique non-
zero equilibrium of Φ is where individuals respond to θopt. Furthermore, each group attains their
optimal qualification rate at this equilibrium.
Proposition 3.1 (Perfect classfication). If there exists θ ∈ Θ such that TPRa(θ) = 1 and
FPRa(θ) = 0 for all a ∈ A, then there is a unique non-zero equilibrium with pi∗a = G(w) for
all a ∈ A.
While realizability is a common assumption in the theory of machine learning, it rarely captures
the subtleties that exist in automated decision making in practice. Next, we consider a mild
relaxation of realizability and consider a setting where a near-perfect decision rule θ ∈ Θ exists
such that TPRa(θ) ≥ 1−  and FPRa(θ) ≤ . As we show (and prove in Appendix A), when there
is a single near-realizable group the main message of Proposition 3.1 remains effectively the same.
That is, all equilibria that are reachable from initial points that are not too extreme approximately
maximize the group’s qualification rate.
Theorem 3.2 (Equilibria under near-realizability). Let |A| = 1 and assume that pTP = cFP = 1.
Assume that for fixed  ∈ (0, 1) , s ∈ (0, 1/2), G is LG-Lipschitz with property that 1− s ≥ G(w) ≥
s+ LGws , and there is θ ∈ Θ such that
TPR(θ) ≥ 1−  and FPR(θ) ≤ .
Then for any initial investment pi(0) ∈ [s, 1− s], pi∗ = limn→∞Φn(pi(0)) is such that
pi∗ ≥ G(w(1− /s)).
A nice aspect of the above results is that the assumption of realizability or near-realizability
can be validated from the data. That is, the decision maker can compute whether there is θ ∈ Θ
such that TPR(θ) ≥ 1 −  and FPR(θ) ≤ . If so, then the decision maker can rest assured that
the dynamical system is on the path towards achieving near optimal investment by the individuals.
Another nice aspect of these results is the characterization of the equilibria in terms of the CDF of
the cost distribution. This allows us to use this framework for studying interventions that change
the cost function directly. One such intervention is subsidizing the cost for individuals so that the
cumulative distribution function of the cost, given by G(x), is increased by a sufficient amount at
every cost level x. The following corollary, proved in Appendix B, shows that under this kind of
subsidy, the equilibria reached by the dynamics will have higher qualification rate than any fixed
point of the dynamics before subsidy, as long as the initial points are not too extreme. As we are
considering different cost distribution functions in the following corollary, we denote the dynamics
corresponding to cost distribution function G as ΦG.
Corollary 3.3 (Subsidizing the cost of investment). Let |A| = 1 and assume that pTP = cFP = 1.
Assume that for fixed  ∈ (0, 1) , s ∈ (0, 1/2), G is LG-Lipschitz with property that 1− s ≥ G(w) ≥
s+ LGws , and there is θ ∈ Θ such that
TPR(θ) ≥ 1−  and FPR(θ) ≤ .
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Let pi∗ > 0 be a fixed point of the dynamics ΦG. Suppose G¯ is a strictly increasing, LG¯-Lipschitz
CDF such that 1−s ≥ G¯(x) ≥ s+LG¯ws and G¯(x(1−/s)) ≥ G(x) for all x in the domain of G. Then
for any initial investment pi(0) ∈ [s, 1− s], there exists a p¯i ≥ pi∗, such that p¯i = limn→∞ΦnG¯(pi(0)).
4 Group Realizability
In this section, we investigate how the nature of equilibria evolves as the assumption of realizability
is relaxed to allow for heterogeneity across groups. Specifically, we consider the case where there
exists a perfect assessment rule for each group, but not when the groups are combined. We call
this “group-realizability”. On a high level, our results illustrate that without realizability or near-
realizability, the utility-maximizing assessment rule can be very sensitive to the relative qualification
rates in different groups, leading to the existence of multiple equilibria — at some of which groups
experience disparate outcomes.
In sections 4.1 and 4.2, we study group-realizability under two different and complementary set-
tings. The first setting considers features that are drawn from a multivariate Gaussian distribution
and assumes that in each group the qualified individuals are perfectly separated from unquali-
fied ones by a group-specific hyperplane. This is a benign setting where no group is inherently
disadvantaged — group features and performance of assessment rules are symmetric up to a repa-
rameterization of the space. The second setting considers features that are uniformly distributed
scalar scores and assumes that qualified and unqualified individuals in a group are separated by a
group-specific threshold, where one is higher than the other. - This model captures the natural
setting where the feature (score) and assessment rules inherently favor one group, e.g., SAT scores
are known to be skewed by race [Card and Rothstein, 2007]. We use the aforementioned stylized
settings to demonstrate the salient characteristics of equilibria that one might anticipate under
group-realizability. We find that stable equilibria tend to favor one group or the other. This is
especially surprising in the multivariate Gaussian case where the two groups are identical up to a
change in the representation of the space. We also study the existence of balanced equilibria, where
both groups acquire qualification at the same rate. We find that when balanced equilibria exist
they tend to be unstable, that is, no initial qualification rate (except for the balanced equilibrium
itself) will converge to the balanced equilibrium under the dynamics.
We consider two natural interventions in overcoming the challenges of group-realizability as
outlined above. As group-realizability poses even greater challenges when the costs of investment
are unequally distributed between groups, in Section 4.3 we consider the impact of subsidizing the
cost of acquiring qualification for one group. In Section 4.4, we consider the impact of decoupling,
that is, we allow the institution to use different assessment rules for different groups assuming
the group attributes are available. This is in contrast to the typical setting where institutions are
constrained to using the same assessment rule across all groups, which may be the case when data
on the protected attribute is not available or when the use of protected attributes for assessment
is regulated.
4.1 Uniformly Distributed Scalar X
We consider X = [0, 1], the class of assessment paramters Θ = [0, 1], and assessment decision
Yˆh = 1{X > h} for all h ∈ Θ that represent all threshold decision policies. Consider two groups
a1, a2. We consider X to be a score that is uniformly distributed over [0, 1] where in group ai
those with score more than hi are qualified and those with score at most hi are unqualified. This
8
Figure 2: Equilibria in Multivariate Gaussian case (left) Uniform case (right)
is depicted in Figure 2 (right). Formally, we have
P(X = x | Y = y,A = ai) =
{
1{x > hi}/(1− hi) for y = 1 and
1{x ≤ hi}/hi for y = 0
Assumption 1. We assume na1 · pTP = na2 · cFP. We also assume, for simplicity that the cost for
acquiring qualifications is uniformly distributed on [0, 1] (i.e. G(c) = c) in both groups; our results,
however, generalize to the setting where the CDF for the cost G : [0, 1] → [0, 1] is an arbitrary
strictly increasing function.
We show that when w is in a certain range, there are two unbalanced stable equilibria corre-
sponding to assessment parameters h1 or h2, which respectively lead to the optimal qualification
rate for groups a1 or a2 but low qualification rate for the other group. There is also a more balanced
but unstable equilibrium at some threshold hmid between h1 and h2. Outside of this range of w,
there is only one equilibrium in which one of the groups achieves its optimal qualification rate .
These findings are summarized in the following two propositions.
Proposition 4.1. Define g :− (1−h1)(−wh22+h2(1−h1)−wh1(1−h1))
w((1−h1)2−h22))
. Note that g ∈ (0, h2 − h1) for any
w. Let w ∈ (wl, wu) where
wl :=
(1− h1)2
(1− h2)h2 + (1− h1)2 , wu :=
h2(1− h1)
h22 + h1(1− h1)
. (3)
Given Assumption 1, there exists two stable equilibria at
h = h1, pia1 = w, pia2 = w ·
h1
h2
, and (4)
h = h2, pia1 = w ·
1− h2
1− h1 , pia2 = w, . (5)
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and a unique non-zero unstable equilibrium at
h = hmid := h1 + g, pia1 = w ·
1− h1 − g
1− h1 , pia2 = w ·
h1 + g
h2
.
In addition, when w = 1− h1 the unstable equilibrium is fully balanced.
Proposition 4.2. Given Assumption 1 when w < wl there exists one stable equilibrium defined by
Equation 5, and when w > wu there exists one stable equilibrium defined by Equation 4.
The details of the proofs are presented in Appendix C. At a high level, if the wage is not too
low or too high, both thresholds h1 and h2 correspond to stable equilibria, at which either group
a1 or a2 is perfectly classified. The equilibrium corresponding to hmid, where the classifier has the
same true positive and false positive rates in both groups, is unstable and subsequently harder to
achieve.
In Table 1, we compare these equilibria in terms of metrics introduced in Section 2, under
the assumptions of Proposition 4.1. We use standard notation  and ∼ to denote preference and
indifference respectively. For example, we find that in terms of balance in qualification rates, the
stable equilibrium associated with h1 is more balanced that the stable equilibrium associated with
h2, but both are always less balanced unstable equilibrium associated with hmid. Details of the
computation are deferred to Table 3 in Appendix C.
Ranking of Equilibria
Stability h1, h2 are stable.
hmid is unstable
Qualification rate of group a1 h1  hmid  h2
Qualification rate of group a2 h2  hmid  h1
Balance of qualification rates hmid  h1  h2
Institution’s Utility no ranking
Table 1: Comparison of equilibria for uniform features. In this table we refer to each equlibria
using the associated threshold decision policy.
4.2 Multivariate Gaussian X
We consider X = Rd and Θ = Sd−1, where Sd−1 is the set of d-dimensional unit vectors. Let Yˆh =
1{X>h ≥ 0} for all h ∈ Θ denote separating hyperplane policies and ∠h,h′ := 1pi arccos( h
>h′
‖h‖‖h′‖)
denote the angle between two vectors, normalized by the constant pi. We consider two groups a1 and
a2 associated respectively with vectors h1 and h2, such that ∠h1,h2 6= 0. We assume the groups have
equal size, i.e., na1 = na2 . For each group the feature distribution forms a d-dimensional spherical
Gaussian centered at the origin such that the qualified individuals are in halfspace 1{X>hi ≥ 0}
and the unqualified individuals in halfspace 1{X>hi < 0}. Formally, for x ∈ Rd and i ∈ {1, 2},
P(X = x | Y = y,A = ai) =
{
2φ(x)1{x>hi ≥ 0} for y = 1 and
2φ(x)1{x>hi < 0} for y = 0,
where φ(x) is the density of the spherical d-dimensional Gaussian. This is depicted in Figure 2 (left).
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Assumption 2. We assume that the CDF for the cost of acquiring qualifications is a strictly
increasing function G : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] and is the same in both groups.
As we will see, the relative gain and loss of the institution for respectively accepting a qualified
or unqualified individual, that is pTP/cFP, plays a role in the nature of the equilibria. The following
proposition characterizes the equilibria when this value is strictly positive, that is, when the benefit
of true positives outweighs the cost of false positives. Surprisingly similar to the previous setting
of uniform scores, the current setting also has two stable equilibria that each favor one group at
the expense of the other, as well as a balanced equilibrium that is unstable.
Proposition 4.3. Given Assumption 2 and pTP > cFP, there exists two stable equilibria, at
h = h1, pia1 = G(w) pia2 = G (w · (1− 2∠h1,h2)) ,
h = h2, pia1 = G (w(1− 2∠h1,h2)) pia2 = G(w).
There is a unique non-zero unstable equilibrium at
h = hmid, pia1 = G (w(1− ∠h1,h2)) pia2 = G (w(1− ∠h1,h2)) ,
where hmid :=
h1+h2
‖h1+h2‖ .
Let us briefly comment on the high level proof idea and defer the full argument to Appendix
D. Since pTP > cFP, the institution cares more about accepting true positives than avoiding false
positives. Therefore, the utility-maximizing h is determined by the group that has a higher quali-
fication rate and thus has a higher fraction of positives — this is h1 (resp. h2) whenever pia1 > pia2
(resp. pia1 < pia2). When qualification rates are equal between the two groups, the institution
maximizes its utility at any h that is a convex combination of h1 and h2, but the unique h that
would induce equal qualification rate is h = hmid, where the classifier has the same true positive
and false positive rates in both groups.
An unfortunate implication of this result is that the dynamics will always converge to an un-
balanced qualification rate, except when the initial levels of investment are exactly the same. Even
though a fully balanced equilibrium exists, it is unstable and therefore not robust to small per-
turbations in either the qualification rates or the classifier, which in practice is unavoidable given
sampling noise.
In Table 2, we compare these equilibria in terms of metrics introduced in Section 2. For example,
we find that in terms of institutional utility, the stable equilibria associated with h1 and h2 are
equally preferred, and are both strictly preferred to the unstable equilibrium associated with hmid.
This implies that the institution has no incentive at all to keep the dynamics at the unstable
equilibrium, even though it induces balanced investment. Exact values are deferred to Table 4 in
Appendix D.
Interestingly, when pTP < cFP, there are no stable equilibria; instead there exists a stable limit
cycle between h1 and h2. This is stated informally in the following proposition.
Proposition 4.4. Given Assumption 2 and pTP < cFP, there exists no stable equilibria. Instead
there exists a limit cycle and one non-trivial unstable equilibrium.
Intuitively, the cycle is caused by misaligned incentives between the institution and the in-
dividuals. As the institution finds false positives more costly than false negatives, it prefers the
hyperplane that classifies more false positives correctly. At each time step, it will choose the hyper-
plane associated with the group that has a lower qualification rate, prompting that group to invest
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Ranking of Equilibria
Stability h1, h2 are stable.
hmid is unstable
Qualification rate of group a1 h1  hmid  h2
Qualification rate of group a2 h2  hmid  h1
Balance of qualification rate hmid  h1 ∼ h2
Institution’s Utility h1 ∼ h2  hmid
Table 2: Comparison of equilibria for Multivariate Gaussian features. In this table we refer to each
equlibria using the associated hyperplane.
more in the next time step. It is striking that even in an simple model involved multivariate Gaus-
sian distributions, a range of limiting behavior is possible for the dynamics in the group-realizable
setting. In Section 6, we also observe the existence of limit cycles in simulations with real data
distributions.
4.3 Different Costs of Investment by Group
Thus far we have assumed that all groups have the same distribution of the cost of investment,
G. In reality, the cost of investment may be distributed differently in each group; a disadvantaged
group might on average experience higher (monetary or opportunity) costs. For example, low
income families who may have to take out loans to pay for college tuition incur high interest rates.
This is a compelling setting that reflects deep-seated disparities in access to opportunity between
demographic groups in the real world; an analogous setting has been considered by works on
strategic classification, where the costs for manipulating features is posited to differ across groups
[Hu et al., 2019, Milli et al., 2019].
In this section, we consider the ramifications of differences in investment cost across groups,
focusing on the setting of Section 4.2. We show that the disadvantage from having higher costs
is amplified under group-realizability. Specifically, suppose that group a1 (resp. a2) has costs
distributed according to cumulative distribution function G1 (resp. G2), and that group a1 is
disadvantaged in terms of costs. The following result observes that if G1 sufficiently dominates
G2, then there exists no stable equilibrium that encourages optimal investment from group a1
and no equilibrium that is balanced for both groups, in sharp contrast to the characterization in
Proposition 4.3. The proof is deferred to Appendix E.
Proposition 4.5. Consider the multi-variate Gaussian setting of Section 4.2. Suppose G1 and
G2 are such that G1(w) < G2(w(1 − 2∠h1,h2)), then there exists a single non-trivial equilibrium
at h2, which is also stable. The level of investment by group a1 (resp. a2) is G1(w(1 − 2∠h1,h2)
(resp. G2(w)).
Effect of subsidies In this situation, an intervention that would effectively raise the equilibrium
level of investment by the disadvantaged group is to subsidize the cost of investment. In particular,
as long as we replace G1 with a stochastically dominated distribution G¯1 such that G¯1 > G2(w(1−
2∠h1,h2)), under the new dynamics Φsub, h1 will again be a stable equilibrium, and there will also
exist a more balanced, unstable equilibrium at h = h¯mid, which is some convex combination of h1
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and h2. At all equilibria of Φ
sub, group a1 will have higher levels of investment than G1(w(1 −
2∠h1,h2)).
However, this improvement may come at a cost to the advantaged group, since Φsub has multiple
equilibria and some of them have group a2 investing less than G2(w). Still one might argue that
the equilibria of Φsub are more equitable, since the dynamics without subsidies always result in
optimal investment by group a2 and low investment by group a1.
4.4 Decoupling the Assessment Rule by Group
The models we studied in Sections 4.2 and 4.1 suggest that applying the same, or “joint”, assessment
rule to heterogeneous groups results in undesirable trade-offs—between balance, stability, and other
metrics—at all equilibria, even though there is a perfect assessment rule in each group that leads
to the optimal qualification rate in that group.
Decoupling the classifier by group is a natural intervention in this setting. Namely, the insti-
tution may choose a group-specific θa ∈ Θ to assess individuals from group a ∈ A, assuming that
the group attribute information is available. This corresponds to choosing θa that maximizes the
utility that the institution derives from each group separately. Thus we now consider the decoupled
dynamics Φdec where the institution uses group-specific assessment rules, i.e., for all a ∈ A
θbra (pia) := argmax
θa∈Θ
pTPTPRa(θa)pia − cFPFPRa(θa)(1− pia).5 (6)
As in the standard joint setting individuals still acquire qualification according to their group
utility as follows
pibra (θa) := G(w(TPRa(θa)− FPRa(θa))).
We denote by pidec ∈ [0, 1]|A| the equilibria of the decoupled dynamics, Φdec = (pibra ◦ θbra )a∈A. It is
not hard to see that decoupling is helpful in a group-realizable setting. That is, the qualification
rates of the decoupled equilibrium pidec Pareto-dominates the qualification rates of all equilibria pi
under a joint assessment rule, whenever group-realizability holds.
Proposition 4.6 (Decoupling). Consider a group-realizable setting, that is, for every a ∈ A, there
exists a perfect assessment rule θopta ∈ Θ such that TPRa(θopta ) − FPRa(θopta ) = 1. Then Φdec has
a unique stable equilibrium pidec, where pideca = G(w). Moreover, for any equilibrium pi of the joint
dynamics Φ, pideca ≥ pia for all a ∈ A. Furthermore, if there is no perfect assessment rule, i.e.,
max
θ∈Θ
∑
a∈A
na(TPRa(θ)− FPRa(θ)) < 1,
then for some a ∈ A, pideca > pia.
The proof of this proposition directly follows from Proposition 3.1.
Indeed, decoupling always helps in the group-realizable setting—not only does it not decrease
any group’s equilibrium qualification rate, it also increases the equilibrium qualification rate of at
least one group when realizability across all groups does not hold. In Sections 5 and 6 we take
a closer look at decoupling in the absence of group-realizability and see that those cases are not
as clear-cut. When group-realizability does not hold, we see that in some cases decoupling is still
helpful while in others it can significantly harm one group.
5As when we defined the joint dynamics (Section 2), when the argmax is not unique, we assume ties are broken
according to a fixed and well-defined order.
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5 Beyond group-realizability: Multiple equilibria within group
Thus far we have considered settings where the learning problem is realizable (or almost realizable)
within each group. This is a common assumption in various prior works, such as in Hu et al. [2019].
As we saw in Section 4, there may be multiple undesirable equilibria when a joint assessment rule
is used in a group-realizable setting, but these undesirable equilibria disappear in the decoupled
dynamics.
In many application domains, realizability does not hold even at a group level. That is to say,
no assessment rule in Θ can perfectly separate qualified and unqualified individuals even within
one group. This may be due to the fact that mapping individuals to the visible feature space X
involves loss of information or there may be other sources of stochasticity in the domain [Corbett-
Davies and Goel, 2018], making it impossible to provide a high accuracy assessment of individuals’
qualifications. A key consequence of the lack of realizability is that even for a single group, the
optimal classifier now can vary greatly with pia, the group’s qualification rate. As a result, our
guarantees about the near-optimality of stable equilibria (Theorem 3.2) no longer hold, and there
could exist multiple stable equilibria each corresponding to a different qualification rate within a
group. In this section, we investigate the existence of bad equilibria for a single group and its
implications on decoupling when the learning problem is not group-realizable. For the rest of this
section, we consider a single group, i.e., |A| = 1 and suppress a in the notation.
In the following proposition, we characterize conditions under which multiple equilibria exists
in arbitrary feature spaces and assessment rules. This is a generalization of a classical result from
Coate and Loury [1993] that considers a one-dimensional feature space; for completeness, we restate
and prove this result as a consequence of Proposition 5.1 in Appendix F.
Proposition 5.1 (Multiple equilibria in arbitrary feature spaces). Let Φ be as defined in Section 2.
For any qualification rate pi, let
β(pi) := TPR(θbr(pi))− FPR(θbr(pi)),
be the difference between true and false positive rates of the institution’s utility maximizing assess-
ment rule with respect to pi. Assume β(pi) is continuous, the CDF of the cost G is continuous and
that there exists θ ∈ Θ such that P(Yˆθ = 1) = 0 and θ′ ∈ Θ such that P(Yˆθ′ = 1) = 1, i.e., there is a
assessment rule that accepts everyone and an assessment rule that rejects everyone. Also suppose
the likelihood ratio φ(x) := P(X=x|Y=0)P(X=x|Y=1) is strictly positive on X .
If x < G(wβ(x)) for some x ∈ (0, 1), then there exists at least two distinct non-zero equilibria
where pi = Φ(pi). If in addition β is differentiable, an equilibrium at pi is locally stable whenever
G′(wβ(pi)) < |β′(pi)|, where G′ and β′ denote the derivatives of G and β respectively.
Proof. When pi = 1, the institution’s best response is to accept everyone regardless of their features,
so β(1) = TPR(θ′)− FPR(θ′) = 1− 1 = 0.6
Note that 1−pipi →∞ as pi → 0. This, together with the fact that φ(x) is strictly positive means
that there must exist p¯i > 0 such that pTPcFP <
1−p¯i
p¯i φ(x) for all x ∈ X . Therefore, for all pi ≤ p¯i,
the institution’s best response is to accept no one regardless of their features, so we have that
β(pi) = TPR(θ)− FPR(θ) = 0− 0 = 0 for pi ≤ p¯i.
Since G(0) = 0, we have that p¯i > G(wβ(p¯i)) = 0 and 1 > G(wβ(1)) = 0. By assumption there
exists x < G(wβ(x)) for some x ∈ (0, 1), and by the above discussion, we must have x ∈ (p¯i, 1).
Hence there must be at least 2 solutions to pi = Φ(pi) in (p¯i, 1) and in particular they are non-zero.
The condition for local stability follows directly from chain rule.
6Recall that FPR(θ) := P(Yˆθ = 1 | do(Y = 0)), which is well-defined even when P(Y = 0) = 0.
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Proposition 5.1 describes conditions under which there exists more than one equilibrium in the
dynamics modeled in Section 2. Given a differentiable β(pi), one can always construct a mono-
tonically increasing G, such that the dynamics Φ has any number of locally stable equilibria. The
implication of having multiple equilibria is that the dynamics may converge to different equilibrium
qualification rates depending on the initial investment, even for a single group. This makes the
setting particularly hard to analyze.
Nevertheless, the following result shows that even in the non-realizable setting, subsidizing the
cost of investment by changing the distribution G to a stochastically dominant distribution G¯ will
create a new equilibrium that has a higher qualification rate. In other words, subsidies in the
non-realizable setting also improve the quality of equilibria. However, the new equilibrium is not
guaranteed to be locally stable. We see some ramifications of this empirically in the next section.
Proposition 5.2 (Subsidies without realizability). Suppose pi∗ > 0 is an equilibrium for the dy-
namics ΦG, where the cost of investment is distributed according to G on [0, 1]. Let G¯ be a CDF
that is stochastically dominated by G, that is, G¯(x) > G(x) for all x ∈ (0, 1), and both G and G¯
are strictly increasing. Then there exists p¯i > pi∗ such that p¯i is an equilibrium for ΦG¯.
Proof. By assumption, we have that G¯−1(pi∗) < G−1(pi∗), so G¯−1(pi∗) < wβ(pi∗). Since G¯−1(1) >
β(1), we must have G¯−1(p¯i) = wβ(pi) for some p¯i ∈ (pi∗, 1).
6 Simulations with non-realizability
In this section we present results from numerical experiments examining the effects of decoupling
and subsidies under our model of dynamics, in the absence of group-realizability. Since the type
of dynamic data needed for experiments on a real application would require randomized controlled
trials, we instead consider a stylized semi-synthetic experiment, based on a widely used FICO credit
score dataset from a 2007 Federal Reserve report [US Federal Reserve, 2007]. Importantly, only
aggregate statistics were reported and the data we accessed does not contain sensitive or private
information. We note that our modeling assumptions may not be realistic for this dataset (see
Section 8 for a discussion) and our simulations should not be interpreted as policy recommendations.
Instead, these experiments help us illustrate qualitatively the types of dynamics one may find using
real world data.
Stylized Model We describe how our model can be instantiated to a highly stylized example of
credit scoring and lending. Assume a loan applicant either has the means to repay a loan or not. If
they have the means to repay, they always repay (Y = 1); otherwise they always default (Y = 0).
In order to have the means to repay, applicants must make an ex ante investment at the cost of
C, whose distribution is P(C < c) = G(c). This represents costly actions an individual has to take
in order to acquire the financial ability to repay loans, e.g. working at a stable job or taking job
preparation classes. Applicants from group a who have the means to repay receive credit scores X
drawn from fa1 and those who don’t receive credit scores drawn from f
a
0 . The decision of the bank
is to approve or reject a loan applicant, given their credit scores.
Dataset FICO scores are widely used in the United States to predict credit worthiness. The
dataset, which contains aggregate statistics, is based on a sample of 301,536 TransUnion TransRisk
scores from 2003 [US Federal Reserve, 2007] and has been preprocessed by Hardt et al. [2016b].
These scores, corresponding to X in our model, range from 300 to 850. For simplicity, we rescale
the scores so that they are between 0 and 1. Individuals were labeled as defaulted if they failed to
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Figure 3: Score distributions conditioning on repayment outcome (Y ) for different race groups
pay a debt for at least 90 days on at least one account in the ensuing 18-24 month period. The
data is also labeled by race, which is the group attribute A that we use. We compute empirical
conditional feature distributions P(X = x | A = a, Y = y) from the available data and fit Beta
distributions7 to these to obtain fa0 , f
a
1 .
We treat these distributions as if they came from our model as shown in Figure 1, for the
sole purpose of illustration. This is not to claim that our modeling assumptions hold on this
dataset, as discussed earlier. Given the lending domain is complex, our aim is not to faithfully
represent this particular domain with our model, but to simulate feature distributions that exhibit
group heterogeneity and non-realizability, hence extending our consideration beyond the idealized
settings of Sections 3 and 4.
Figure 3 shows the histograms as well as the fitted Beta distributions for fa0 , f
a
1 , where a is the
race attribute. It is clear that group-realizability does not hold even approximately, since there is
significant overlap in the distributions of credit scores for people who repaid and for people who
did not repay.
6.1 Effects of Decoupling when Multiple Stable Equilibria Exist
Although decoupling is guaranteed to improve the qualification rate at equilibrium over using a joint
decision rule for every group (Sections 3 and 4), this is not necessarily true in the non-realizable
7We simulate 100,000 samples from the empirical PDF (see Figure 3) and fit a Beta distribution by maximum
likelihood estimation.
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Figure 4: Effects of decoupling in presence of multiple equilibria. We vary the initial qualification
rate in the x-axis. The right (resp. left) plot was generated using a bimodal normal distribution
for G with modes at 0.57 and 0.74 (resp. at 0.57 and 0.63).
setting. In fact, even when G is the uniform distribution on [0, 1] in all groups (i.e. the cost
of investment C is uniformly distributed on [0, 1], as we considered in Section 4), decoupling did
not benefit all groups. As can be seen from Figure 6 in Appendix G, while the White and Asian
groups had a higher qualification rate after decoupling, the Black and Hispanic groups saw their
equilibrium qualification rate decrease. On the other hand, the effects of decoupling were small in
this case (less than 3 percent points difference in the final qualification rate).
We now show that the effect of decoupling can be drastic depending on G. Recall that in
Section 5, we showed that multiple equilibria, with possibly vastly different qualification rates,
may exist under the non-realizable setting even when there is a only single group. In general the
existence of multiple equilibria depends on properties of G, that is, how the cost of investment
is distributed in a group. In Figure 4, we show the change in equilibrium investment level after
decoupling for an experiment with two groups, Asian and Hispanic. The two plots each correspond
to a different bimodal Gaussian distribution for G, truncated to [0, 1], that have been chosen such
that the decoupled dynamics have multiple stable equilibria for the Hispanic (right) and the Asian
(left) respectively.
In both plots, we can see that the effects of decoupling depend on the initial qualification rate.
If the initial qualification rate was too low, or too high, the decoupled dynamics converge to an
equilibrium where one of the groups invest in qualifications at a much lower level than they would
under the joint dynamics.8
6.2 Subsidizing the Cost of Investment
In this experiment, we consider if subsidizing the cost of investment of one group by changing
G improves their new equilibrium qualification rate, under both decoupled and joint dynamics.
Specifically, we vary the cost of investment in the Black group.
We use a truncated normal distribution for G and vary its mean (on the x-axis) for a single
group, while keeping the other groups’ G unchanged (mean of 0.6).
Figure 5 shows that subsidizing the cost of investment is effective in raising the equilibrium in-
vestment level of a group, both in the joint learning and decoupled learning case. Interestingly, large
8Figure 7 in Appendix G shows the converged qualification rates of both groups under decoupled and joint
dynamics.
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Figure 5: Effects of raising the average cost of investment, by varying the mean of G on the x-axis.
amounts of subsidy for a single group reduced the equilibrium investment levels of other groups. As
also suggested by theoretical results in section 4.3, subsidizing the qualification rate of one group
does sometimes entail a tradeoff in the qualification rates of other possibly more advantaged groups.
Interestingly, lowering the mean cost of investment in the Black group below 0.35 caused the
final qualification rate to decrease. This is not a contradiction of Proposition 5.2, which argues that
equilibria improve under subsidies but does not guarantee that the dynamics will converge to the
improved equilibrium. In this case, the decoupled dynamics for the Black group (where the mean
cost of investment is 0.30) actually converged to a limit cycle and the final qualification rate in
the plot is an average of the points in the limit cycle. Limit cycles are a challenging object to
study in dynamical systems and game theory. While we have commented on their existence in a
simple model in group-realizable setting of Section 4.2, we leave their implications in the general
non-realizable setting to future work.
7 Related Work
Our work follows a growing line of work on how machine learning algorithms interact with human
actors in a dynamic setting, with the goal of understanding and mitigating disparate impact.
Recent work examine the long-term impact of group fairness criteria [see e.g., Barocas et al.,
2018, Chapter 2] on automated decision making systems: Liu et al. [2018] show that static fairness
criteria fail to account for the delayed impact that decisions have on the welfare of disadvantaged
groups. In the context of hiring, however, Hu and Chen [2018] find that applying the demographic
parity constraint in a temporary labor market achieves an equitable long-term equilibrium in the
permanent labor market by raising worker reputations.
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Prior work on the fairness of machine learning has also examined tradeoffs between fairness
criteria [Kleinberg et al., Chouldechova, 2017], as well as the incompatibility between risk mini-
mization and fairness criteria [Liu et al., 2019], assuming that the qualification rates differ across
groups. These results concern the static setting, whereas we highlight the fact that qualification
rates tend to change in response to the decision rules in place.
Another line of work [Hashimoto et al., 2018, Zhang et al., 2019] analyzes a dynamic model
where users respond to errors made by an institution by leaving the user base uniformly at random,
and demonstrate how the risk-minimizing approach to machine learning can amplify representation
disparity over time. This is complementary to our work which models individuals as rational
decision makers who may or may not have the incentive to acquire the positive label. In particular,
Hashimoto et al. [2018] show that equilibria with equal user representation from all groups can
be unstable, and that robust learning can stabilize such equilibria. Unlike in our model, the user
representation model does not distinguish between positive and negative labels, and thus do not
distinguish between false negative and false positive errors. This is a crucial distinction in high-
stakes decision making as different error types present asymmetric incentives for individuals, as
explained in Section 2; for example, a high false positive rate in hiring would encourage under-
qualified job applicants.
Hu et al. [2019] and Milli et al. [2019] study the disparate impact of being robust towards
strategic manipulation [see e.g., Hardt et al., 2016a], where individuals respond to machine learning
systems by manipulating their features to get a better classification. In contrast to our model
(Figure 5), their setting models the individual as intervening directly on their features, X, and this
is assumed to have no effect on their qualification Y . This assumption applies to features that are
easy to ‘game’ (e.g. scores on standardized tests can be improved by test preparation classes) but
is less applicable to features that more directly correspond to investment in one’s qualifications
(e.g. taking AP courses in high school). Hu et al. [2019] also show that subsidizing the costs of
the disadvantaged group to strategically manipulate their features can sometimes lead to harmful
effects. Kleinberg and Raghavan [2019] study a non-dynamic setting where some features of the
individual result in higher qualification and some do not, as described by an “effort profile”, which
is a direct manipulation of X, that the institution wants to incentivize the individual to pursue.
Our work is also related to the topic of statistical discrimination in economics [Phelps, 1972,
Arrow, 1973, 1998], which studies how disparate market outcomes at equilibrium can arise from
imperfect information. This line of work often involves wage discrimination, whereas we assume
the wage is fixed and standard for all groups. Coate and Loury [1993] proposed a model of rational
individual investment in the labor market under a fixed wage and showed that affirmative action9
may lead to an undesirable equilibrium where one group still invests sub-optimally. The model in
our work is most closely related to their model, with two key distinctions: 1) We allow features
X to be multi-dimensional, whereas Coate and Loury [1993] assumes that X is a one-dimensional
‘noisy signal’. 2) We consider the case where the conditional feature distributions, P(X = x | Y =
y,A = a), differ by groups whereas Coate and Loury [1993] assumes that the groups are identically
distributed. Note that under our models, if the conditional feature distributions were shared across
groups, then any hiring policy will result in fully balanced equilibria where all groups have the same
qualification rate and are hired at the same rate. This does not corroborate with reality, where
conditional feature distributions do in fact differ across groups and we routinely observe institutions
applying the same model to all individuals only to see obviously discriminatory outcomes [Dastin,
2019]. By modeling feature heterogeneity across groups, we find that it necessarily leads to disparate
9In this work, affirmative action is defined as constraining the rate of acceptance, P(Yˆθ = 1 | A = a), to be equal
in both groups.
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equilibria.
Recently, Mouzannar et al. [2019] studied the equilibria of qualification rates under a generic
class of dynamics, focusing on contractive maps and the effects of affirmative action. In contrast,
our work motivates a model of dynamics based on rational investment, and this typically leads to
non-contractive dynamics. We are both interested in balanced equilibria, which Mouzannar et al.
[2019] terms ‘social equality’.
Finally, our work studies two interventions for finding more desirable equilibria: decoupling the
classifier and subsidizing the cost of investment. Several works, including Dwork et al. [2018] and
Ustun et al. [2019] have studied decoupled classifiers in the static classification setting. Our work
sheds light on when such interventions are useful in the dynamic decision making setting.
8 Discussion and Future Work
In this work, we have made the following contributions:
1. We proposed a dynamic model of automated decision making where individuals invest ratio-
nally based on the current assessment rule. We studied the properties of equilibria under these
dynamics.
2. We showed that common properties of real data, namely heterogeneity across groups and the
lack of realizability, lead to undesirable tradeoffs at equilibria, resulting in long term outcomes
that disadvantage one or more groups.
3. We considered two interventions—decoupling and subsidizing the cost of investment—and showed
that they have a significant impact on the nature of equilibria both in theory and in numerical
experiments.
We now discuss the limitations of the current work and avenues for future research. Questions
related to finite sampling and its ramifications for the nature of equilibria are challenging and
warrant further study. This work assumed that the institution has unbiased (and zero-variance)
estimates of true and false positive rates over the entire population, even though it presumably
can only observe the qualification of candidates after hiring them. This is known as the selective
labeling problem, which could introduce bias. In theory, unbiased estimates can be achieved by a
small degree of random sampling and appropriate reweighting [see e.g., Kilbertus et al., 2019], but
this is still a large problem in practice that requires domain-specific knowledge and solutions [De-
Arteaga et al., 2018, Kallus and Zhou, 2018].
Our model assumed that individuals make a rational decision to invest and can affect their
qualification Y directly. This assumption could be reasonable in settings like hiring, for example,
where investing to acquire skills usually leads to increased competence. In some settings, however,
individuals may be unable to effectively intervene on Y . For example, a business loan applicant
who is a good business operator could still default on their loan due to external economic shocks or
other forms of disadvantage that have not been taken into account. In this case, the current model
does not fully capture the complex societal processes that lead to a positive outcome. Our work
nonetheless shows that even in an idealized setting where individuals can effectively and rationally
intervene on their outcome labels Y , underlying factors such as heterogeneity across groups and
non-realizability already lead to undesirable tradeoffs at equilibrium. We leave the extensions of
the current model beyond rational individual investment to future work.
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A Proof of Theorem 3.2
For any pi ∈ [s, 1− s], consider the profit-maximizing classifier,
θbr(pi) = argmax
θ∈Θ
TPR(θ) · pi − FPR(θ) · (1− pi).
Let pi(0) be the initial qualification rate. For ease of notation, denote θ∗ = θbr(pi(0)). We
examine the new qualification rate pi1 under the best response model θ
∗. Since there exists a θ such
that TPR(θ) ≥ 1 −  and FPR(θ) ≤ , we have TPR(θ) · pi − FPR(θ) · (1 − pi) ≥ pi − . It follows
that
TPR(θ∗) · pi − FPR(θ∗) · (1− pi) = pi(TPR(θ∗)− FPR(θ∗)) + (2pi − 1)FPR(θ∗) ≥ pi − 
Rearranging this inequality gives the following lower bound on TPR(θ∗)− FPR(θ∗):
TPR(θ∗)− FPR(θ∗) ≥ pi − − (2pi − 1)FPR(θ
∗)
pi
(7)
For pi < 1/2, it follows from (7) that
TPR(θ∗)− FPR(θ∗) ≥ pi − 
pi
(using FPR(θ∗) ≥ 0)
≥ 1− 
s
(8)
For pi > 1/2, we have
FPR(θ∗) ≤ piTPR(θ
∗)− pi + 
1− pi ≤

1− pi .
Substituting this into (7) gives:
TPR(θ∗)− FPR(θ∗) ≥ pi − − (2pi − 1)

1−pi
pi
= 1− 
1− pi ≥ 1−

s
(9)
Therefore the new qualification rate pi1 satisfies pi1 > G(w(1− /s)).
Notice that pi1 ≤ G(w) ≤ 1−s and pi1 > G(w(1−/s)) ≥ G(w)−LGw/s ≥ s, so we may repeat
the argument to conclude that the qualification rate in the limit must be greater than G(w(1−/s)).
B Proof of Corollary 3.3
From Theorem 3.2 applied to investment level G¯, we can conclude p¯i ≥ G¯(w(1− /s)). By assump-
tion G¯(w(1− /s)) ≥ G(w), thus it remains to show G(w) ≥ pi. However, this follows immediately
from the fact that 1 ≥ TPR(θ)− FPR(θ), ∀θ ∈ Θ.
C Supplementary material and proofs for Section 4.1
Proof of Proposition 4.1 . First consider the policy Yˆ1 = 1{X > h1}. Given this policy, we have
pia1 = G(w) and pia2 = G(w(1− h2−h1h2 )) = G
(
w · h1h2
)
. Yˆ1 is optimal for this pi if the gain from true
positives in group a offsets the loss from false positives in group a2 for X ∈ [h1, h2], i.e. we need
G(w) · na1 · pTP
1− h1 >
(
1−G
(
w · h1h2
))
· na2 · cFP
h2
. (10)
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Now consider the policy Yˆ2 = 1{X > h2}. Given this policy, we have pia1 = G
(
w · 1−h21−h1
)
and
pia2 = G(w). Yˆ2 is optimal for this pi if the gain from true positives in group a fails to offset the
loss from false positives in group a2, for X ∈ [h1, h2], i.e. we need
G
(
w · 1−h21−h1
)
· na · pTP
1− h1 <
(1−G (w)) · na2 · cFP
h2
. (11)
Direct computation shows that (10) and (11) are satisfied as long as w lies in the interval(
h2(1− h1)
h22 + h1(1− h1)
,
(1− h1)2
(1− h2)h2 + (1− h1)2
)
.
Both equilibria above are stable since (10) and (11) hold with strict inequality. For all small
enough perturbations to (pia1 , pia2), h1 (or h2) will still remain as the profit maximizing threshold.
There exists an equilibrium at h = h1 + g if we have
G(w · 1−h1−g1−h1 )
1− h1 =
1−G(w · h1+gh2 )
h2
(12)
Direct computation shows that the above equation is satisfied by a unique value of
g =
(1− h1)(−wh22 + h2(1− h1)− wh1(1− h1))
w((1− h1)2 − h22))
,
and that pia1 =
w(1−h1−g)
1−h1 = pia2 =
w(h1+g)
h2
if w = 1− h1.
For an illustration of Proposition 4.1, consider an example where na1 ·pTP = na2 ·cFP, G(c) = c for
c < 1 (uniformly distributed cost of investment), and h1 = 0.4, h2 = 0.8, which gives h1/h2 = 0.5.
Let w = 0.6. We compute:
G(w)
1− h1 = 1,
1−G
(
w · h1h2
)
h2
= 0.875,
G
(
w · 1−h21−h1
)
1− h1 = 1/3,
1−G(w)
h2
= 1/2,
and check that these satisfy the assumptions.
In this example, note that the first equilibrium has qualification rate 0.6 and 0.3 for groups
a and a2 respectively, while the second equilibrium has qualification rate 0.2 and 0.6 respectively.
The first equilibrium might be more desirable since there is higher qualification rate overall, though
neither equilibrium has equal qualification rates across the two groups.
Comparison of equilibria We can compare the equilibria described in Proposition 4.1 in terms
of metrics shown in Table 3. There is no fixed ranking for the Institution’s utility; instead the
ranking varies depending on the values of h1, h2, and w.
Lemma C.1 (Skill acquisition in group a1). Let w ∈ (wl, wu), as defined in (3). Then for h1, h2,
as defined in Proposition 4.1, we have
w · 1− h2
1− h1 <
(w − h2)(1− h1)
(1− h1)2 − h22
< w (13)
25
Equilibrium h h1 h2 hm := h1 + g Ranking
Stability Stable Stable Unstable -
Qualification rate
in group a1, pia1
w w · 1−h21−h1
(w−h2)(1−h1)
(1−h1)2−h22 h1  hm  h2
(Lem. C.1)
Qualification rate
in group a2, pia2
w · h1h2 w
(1−h1)2−wh2
(1−h1)2−h22 h2  hm  h1
(Lem. C.2)
Balance in qualifi-
cation rate |pia1 −
pia2 |
w · h2−h1h2 w · h2−h11−h1
|1−h1−w|
h2−(1−h1) hm  h1  h2
(Lem. C.3)
Table 3: Comparison of equilibria for uniform scores. In this table we refer to each equlibria using
the associated threshold decision policy.
Proof. First we show that (w−h2)(1−h1)
(1−h1)2−h22
< w for all w ∈ (wl, wu). It suffices to show that(
1− h2
w
)
(1− h1) ≤ (1− h1)2 − h22
holds for w = wu, since the LHS is strictly increasing in w. We may check by computation that
the above in fact holds with equality.
Next we show that (w−h2)(1−h1)
(1−h1)2−h22
> w · 1−h21−h1 for all w ∈ (wl, wu). This amounts to showing that(
1− h2
w
)
(1− h1)2 ≥ (1− h2)((1− h1)2 − h22)),
for w = wl, since the LHS is strictly increasing in w. We may check by computation that the above
in fact holds with equality.
Lemma C.2 (Qualification rate in group a2). Let w ∈ (wl, wu), as defined in (3). Then for h1, h2,
as defined in Proposition 4.1, we have
w · h1
h2
<
(1− h1)2 − wh2
(1− h1)2 − h22
< w (14)
Proof. First we show that (1−h1)
2−wh2
(1−h1)2−h22
< w for all w ∈ (wl, wu). It suffices to show that
(1− h1)2
w
− h2 ≤ (1− h1)2 − h22)
holds for w = wl, since the LHS is strictly decreasing in w. We may check by computation that
the above in fact holds with equality.
Next we show that w · h1h2 <
(1−h1)2−wh2
(1−h1)2−h22
for all w ∈ (wl, wu). This amounts to showing that
h2(1− h1)2
w
− h22 ≥ h1((1− h1)2 − h22)
for w = wu, since the LHS is strictly decreasing in w. We may check by computation that the
above in fact holds with equality.
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Lemma C.3 (Unstable Equilibrium is the most balanced). Let w ∈ (wl, wu), as defined in (3).
Then for h1, h2, as defined in Proposition 4.1, we have
|1− h1 − w|
h2 − (1− h1) < w ·
h2 − h1
h2
< w · h2 − h1
1− h1 (15)
Proof. First note that since h2 > 1−h1 by assumption, we have w · h2−h1h2 < w · h2−h11−h1 , so it suffices
to show that
|1−h1w − 1|
h2 − (1− h1) <
h2 − h1
h2
for all w ∈ (wl, wu). Consider the first case: w ∈ (wl, 1− h1]. We want to show
1−h1
w − 1
h2 − (1− h1) <
h2 − h1
h2
. (16)
Since the LHS is decreasing in w, it suffices to show that (16) holds for w = wl. By computation,
we have following:
1−h1
wl
− 1
h2 − (1− h1) <
h2 − h1
h2
⇐⇒ (h2 + 1)(h2 − h1)(h1 + h2 − 1) > 0, (17)
which is indeed satisfied since we have h2 > h1 and h2 > 1− h1 by assumption.
Now consider the second case: w ∈ (wl, 1− h1). We want to show
1− 1−h1w
h2 − (1− h1) <
h2 − h1
h2
. (18)
Since the LHS is increasing in w, it suffices to show that (18) holds for w = wu. By computation,
we have following:
1− 1−h1wu
h2 − (1− h1) <
h2 − h1
h2
<
h2 − h1
h2
⇐⇒ (h2 − h1)(h1 + h2 − 1) > 0, (19)
which is indeed satisfied since we have h2 > h1 and h2 > 1− h1 by assumption.
D Supplementary material and proofs for Section 4.2
Proof of Proposition 4.3 . Denote r := pTPcFP . For any hyperplane h, we may compute the true
positive rate and false positive rate for a group with hyperplane hi as follows:
TPRai = 1− ∠h,hi , FPRai = ∠h,hi . (20)
Therefore, for any investment levels (pia1 , pia2), the firm solves the following profit maximization
problem:
h∗ = argmax
h∈Sd−1
rpia1(1− ∠h,h1)− (1− pia1)∠h,h1 + rpia2(1− ∠h,h2)− (1− pia2)∠h,h2
= argmax
h∈Sd−1
(1− r)pia1∠h,h1 + (1− r)pia2∠h,h2 − (∠h,h1 + ∠h,h2).
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Equilibrium h h1 h2 hmid Ranking by
metric
Stability Stable Stable Unstable -
Qualification
rate in group
a1, pia1
w w(1− 2∠) w(1− ∠) h1  hmid 
h2
Qualification
rate in group
a2, pia2
w(1− 2∠) w w(1− ∠) h2  hmid 
h1
Balance in
qualification
rate |pia1 −pia2 |
2w∠ 2w∠ w∠ hmid  h1 ∼
h2
Institution’s
utility
pTPw(2 − 3∠) +
2(pTP − cFP)w∠2
pTPw(2 − 3∠) +
2(pTP − cFP)w∠2
pTPw(2 − 3∠) +
(pTP − cFP)w∠2
h1 ∼ h2 
hmid
Table 4: Comparison of equilibria for Multivariate Gaussian features
The last term ∠h,h1 +∠h,h2 is minimized whenever h is in the convex hull of h1 and h2. Then it
is clear that for r > 1, the profit is maximized at h = h1 whenever pia1 > pia2 , at h = h2 whenever
pia1 < pia2 , and at any h in the convex hull of h1 and h2 whenever pia1 = pia2 .
To conclude that h = h1 and h = h2 are indeed stable equilibria, we check the best response
qualification rates by both groups at h = h1 and h = h2 satisfies the optimality conditions. For
h = h1, we have pi
br
a1(h1) = G(w) and pi
br
a2(h1) = G (w · (1− 2∠h1,h2)), and indeed pibra1 > pibra2 , by the
monotonicity of G. For h = h2, we have pi
br
a1(h2) = G (w · (1− 2∠h1,h2)) and pibra2(h2) = G(w), and
indeed pibra1 < pi
br
a2 .
Now we identify the unstable equilibrium, which is h = hmid, because the qualification rate is
indeed equal for both groups under this policy, i.e., we have
pibra1 = G(w(1− 2∠h1,hmid)) = G(w(1− ∠h1,h2)) = G(w(1− 2∠h2,hmid)) = pibra2 .
When both groups are investing at this rate, we may assume that the institution’s best response
involves breaking ties among all utility-maximizing hyperplanes to choose hmid. This ensures that
the dynamics are well-defined. Notice that this is an unstable equilibrium, since this is the unique
value of h such that pibra2(h) = pi
br
a2(h), and any deviation from equal qualification rates will change
the profit-maximizing hyperplane to h1 or h2.
Proof of Proposition 4.4 . Following the proof of Proposition 4.3, we find that for pTP < cFP, the
profit is maximized at h = h1 whenever pia1 < pia2 , at h = h2 whenever pia1 > pia2 , and at any h in
the convex hull of h1 and h2 whenever pia1 = pia2 .
Checking the qualification rate at h = h1 (resp. h = h2), we find that pi
br
a1(h1) = G(w) and
pibra2(h1) = G (w · (1− ∠h1,h2)), so pibra1(h1) > pibra2(h1). Similarly, we have pibra1(h2) < pibra2(h2). This
implies there is a 2-point limit cycle at h = h1 and h = h2.
As before, the unstable equilibrium is at h = hmid, because the qualification rate is indeed
equal for both groups under this policy. Notice that this is an unstable equilibrium, since this is
the unique value of h such that pibra2(h) = pi
br
a2(h).
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Comparison of equilibria In Table 4, we compare the equilibria described in Proposition 4.3
on several metrics. We use ∠ to denote ∠h1,h2 .
E Supplementary material for Section 4.3
Proof of Proposition 4.5 . First notice that by assumption, h = h1 cannot be at equilibrium. It
is easy to check that G1(w(1 − 2∠h1,h2)) ≤ G1(w) < G2(w(1 − 2∠h1,h2)) ≤ G2(w), so h = h2 is
still at a stable equilibrium. Now, for any h that is a convex combination of h1 and h2, we have
G1(w(1 − 2∠h,h1)) ≤ G1(w) < G2(w(1 − 2∠h1,h2)) ≤ G2(w(1 − 2∠h,h2)), implying that G1(w(1 −
2∠h,h1)) 6= G2(w(1− 2∠h,h2)) for all h that maximize institutional utility, so no other fixed points
exist.
F Supplementary material and proofs for Section 5
The following result from Coate and Loury [1993] establishes conditions under which multiple
equilibria exists for a single group when the features X = [0, 1] represent a score and the assessment
rule is a threshold function. For completeness, we show that it can be derived as a consequence of
Proposition 5.1.
Proposition F.1 (Proposition 1 of Coate and Loury [1993]). Consider the case where X = [0, 1]
is a space of one-dimensional scores, Θ = [0, 1], and Yˆθ = 1{X > θ} for all θ ∈ Θ. Denote the
conditional score CDFs as
F1(x) := P(X < x | Y = 1), F0(x) := P(X < x | Y = 0).
Let f1(x), f0(x) be the point densities of F1 and F0, respectively. Let φ(x) :=
f0(x)
f1(x)
be the likelihood
ratio at x. Let r := pTPcFP be the ratio of net gain to loss for the firm. Assume φ(x) is strictly
decreasing — i.e. as score increases, candidate is more likely to be skilled — continuous and strictly
positive on [0, 1]. Further assume that G(c) is continuous and G(w(F0(θ) − F1(θ))) > φ(θ)r+φ(θ) for
some θ ∈ (0, 1). Then there exists at least two distinct non-zero equilibria.
Proof of Proposition F.1. Note that for any θ, TPR(θ)− FPR(θ) = F0(θ)− F1(θ). Therefore, the
group’s qualification rate in response to assessment parameter θ is
pibr(θ) = G(w(F0(θ)− F1(θ))). (21)
Since φ(x) is strictly decreasing, the utility maximizing assessment rule θ in response to the
qualification rate pi is
θbr(pi) = inf
{
x ∈ [0, 1] : r ≥ 1− pi
pi
· φ(x)
}
. (22)
Since φ(x) is continuous and strictly positive, we must also have that F0, F1 are continuous, and
so in particular β(pi) = F0(θ
br(pi)) − F1(θbr(pi)) is continuous. By assumption, G is continuous
and there exists x ∈ (0, 1) such that x < G(wβ(x)) since θbr(pi) is surjective. Therefore, the claim
follows from Proposition 5.1.
G Supplementary material for Section 6
We collect here additional figures for Section 6.
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Figure 6: Effects of decoupling without multiple equilibria. G is the uniform distribution on [0, 1]
for all groups and the reward is w = 1. The decoupled equilibria are unique for this choice of G.
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Figure 7: Effects of decoupling in presence of multiple equilibria. We vary the initial level of
investment in the x-axis. A different bimodal Gaussian distribution G was used to generated each
plot.
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